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AUSTRALIA’S “NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS”: A NEW APPROACH OR A NEW
PATERNALISM?
Joshua M. Piper†
Abstract: The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”)
opened its doors in 1990 with the main objectives of advising the Australian
Commonwealth Government (“Government”) on Indigenous policy and providing services
for Indigenous communities and individuals. Fifteen years later, with Indigenous living
standards still well behind other Australians, the Government deemed ATSIC a failure and
abruptly gutted and abolished the Commission. At the same time, the government
transitioned to its New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs program (“New
Arrangements”).
The New Arrangements are based on two fundamental ideas: better coordination
between governments and agencies; and, most important, engaging and empowering
Indigenous communities to run their own affairs and find their own solutions. To
implement these ideas, the Government relies on negotiated agreements as the best way to
reformulate Indigenous-State relations. Under this model, Government Indigenous
Coordination Centers will negotiate agreements directly with local Indigenous
representative bodies to remedy issues identified by Indigenous peoples themselves. As
such, the New Arrangements framework successfully incorporates the principles of
modern contractualism, which has potential to fulfill Indigenous peoples’ desires for
sovereignty and justice.
However, in transitioning to the New Arrangements, the Government acted hastily
and unilaterally, potentially undermining the success of its new program. With some
adjustments and additions, the Government can strengthen the new policy and redress any
harm caused by the quick and uncompromising transition.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the East Kimberly region of Western Australia, on the edge of the
Tanami Desert, lives a remote Indigenous1 community of about 150 people
known as the Mulan.2 In 2003, the Mulan found themselves with two
serious problems to confront: their fuel pump and storage tanks were
corroded, requiring a ninety kilometer round trip to the next community to
get fuel; and the community’s children had one of the world’s highest rates
of trachoma—a bacterial infection of the eyes and the most common cause
†

University of Washington School of Law, J.D. expected 2006.The author would like to thank
Jennifer Sorenson as well as the members of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their unparalleled
patience and support, especially Alyssa Vegter, without whom this Comment would never have been
published.
1
As a matter of brevity and uniformity, I use the terms “Indigenous” and “Indigenous Australians”
throughout the Comment when referring to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and the Torres Strait Islands.
2
See Stuart Rintoul, Long Walk Pushes Accord Talk, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 11, 2004,
Features, at 20.
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of preventable blindness in the world.3 For the fuel facilities, the Mulan
leadership approached the Commonwealth Government (“Government”) for
replacement funds but was denied.4 To combat the trachoma, the
community instituted a twice-daily face-washing program at school;
eighteen months later, trachoma infection rates among children had dropped
from eighty percent to sixteen percent.5
As the Mulan (and many other Indigenous communities) confronted
pervasive and enduring poor living standards, the Government’s Indigenous
Affairs program was in upheaval.6 The Government had introduced
legislation to abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission
(“ATSIC”), a national Indigenous representative body responsible for
delivery of a major portion of the Government’s Indigenous services.7 At
the same time, the Government rapidly instituted what it called the New
Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs (“New Arrangements”).8 This purely
administrative reform was based on the principles of better government
coordination and “shared responsibility” in achieving tangible
improvements for Indigenous Australians.9 The New Arrangements relied
heavily on negotiated agreements to ensure this shared responsibility.10
These two narratives converged in December 2004 when the Mulan
signed the first publicized Shared Responsibility Agreement (“SRA”) under
the New Arrangements.11 Under the agreement, the Mulan received new
fuel facilities—worth $172,260—from the Government in exchange for
promises to continue and expand their hygiene program; children had to
shower daily in addition to washing their faces twice a day, and everyone

3

Amanda Banks & Paige Taylor, Routine Routs Eye Disease, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 10, 2004, Local, at
1; Rintoul, supra note 2. Four out of five Mulan children aged 10 to 16 were infected with Chlamydia
trachomatis bacterium. See Banks & Taylor, supra.
4
See Steve Pennells, Rules Unfair, Say Proud Mulan People, THE AGE, Dec. 10, 2004.
5
Banks & Taylor, supra note 3.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill 2004, No. 04090 (Cth.).
8
Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, New Service Delivery Arrangements for Indigenous Affairs (Apr. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media04/v04012.htm; OFFICE OF INDIGENOUS POLICY COORDINATION,
DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS (2004) [hereinafter NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS].
9
NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1-2.
10
Id. at 17-18.
11
Emma Macdonald, Washing Hands of Responsibility: Carr, CANBERRA TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at
A5; DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
AGREEMENT FACT SHEET, MULAN, WESTERN AUSTRALIA, available at http://www.indigenous.gov.au/sra/
wa/fact_sheets/wa08.pdf.
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had to reduce the amount of rubbish in the town.12 This first SRA was a
fitting inagural agreement because it embodied both the potential for
positive outcomes through the New Arrangements, as well as the
Government’s seeming insensitivity and carelessness in implementing them.
Initially, the Mulan have seen beneficial results in terms of physical health
(trachoma rates are now at zero) and economics, as well as exercising some
form of self-determination. However, the cries from many Indigenous
leaders of paternalism, assimilation, and social engineering inherent in the
Mulan agreement highlight how haphazard and unplanned the transition has
been.13
The New Arrangements have empirical potential for redressing many
Indigenous inequities because their basis in contract theory can engage the
structures of self-determination within Indigenous communities.14 These
agreements by themselves should be seen as a first step towards greater selfdetermination, sovereignty, and justice.15 The contract model is no panacea,
however, and in the Indigenous-State context must be carefully implemented
with appropriate protections.16 If the Government, led by Prime Minister
John Howard, truly wishes to “improve the outcomes and opportunities and
hopes of indigenous people,”17 it needs to invest heavily in Indigenous
leadership capacity, support a new national Indigenous representative
structure, and make the New Arrangements more transparent and
independent through legislation.18
The next Part of this Comment details the evolution of
Commonwealth Indigenous policy in Australia leading up to the New
Arrangements, focusing mainly on the operation and eventual demise of
ATSIC.
Part III examines the increasing scholarship on modern
contractualism,19 which endorses the use of negotiated agreements between
Indigenous people and settler, or post-colonial, governments as a way to
remedy historical inequity and injustice. Part IV explores the New
12

Macdonald, supra note 11.
See Patricia Karvelas & Stuart Rintoul, It’s Patronising, Declares Lowitja, WEEKEND
AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 11, 2004, Local, at 4; Pennels, supra note 4; Pat Dodson & Noel Pearson, Op-Ed., The
Dangers of Mutual Obligation, THE AGE, Dec. 15, 2004.
14
See infra Parts III.B-C, IV.B.
15
See infra Part IV.B.
16
See infra Part III.E.
17
Prime Minister John Howard, Joint Press Conference with Senator Amanda Vanstone (Apr. 15,
2004), http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview795.html.
18
See infra Part V.B-D.
19
I use the term “contractualism” interchangeably with “agreement making” throughout most of the
Comment to refer to the process of negotiated agreements.
13
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Arrangements in detail, concluding that they are a successful
implementation of contractual principles and hold unique promise for
Indigenous Australians seeking self-determination and meaningful justice.
Part V argues that, because the Howard government acted hastily and
unilaterally in completely abolishing ATSIC and implementing the New
Arrangements, it needs to take immediate and earnest steps to repair any
potential damage.
THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO REDRESS
INDIGENOUS INEQUITIES IN THE PAST THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION

II.

Since 1967,20 the Government has attempted to implement Indigenous
policies reflecting self-determination and self-management, as well as
provide a national representative voice for Indigenous Australians.21 These
attempts were in response to the inequitable living standards of Indigenous
peoples across Australia.22 Prior to ATSIC, the most notable attempts were
the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, created in 1973 and
succeeded by the National Aboriginal Conference in 1977, the members of
which were elected solely by Indigenous Australians.23 However, because
these organizations remained primarily advisory bodies and were not always
well-connected to their constituents, they proved less successful than
expected.24 When it created ATSIC in 1989, the Hawke Government25
sought a body with a much closer relationship to government and the power
and responsibility to deliver programs and services.26 Unfortunately, due to
structural conflicts created at its inception and frequent amendments, ATSIC
failed to achieve broad, meaningful results for Indigenous Australians.27

20

A 1967 Constitutional referendum allowed Parliament to legislate specifically towards Indigenous
issues without violating prohibitions against racial preference. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, § 51(xxvi).
21
See Kingsley Palmer, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Research
Discussion Paper No. 12, ATSIC: Origins and Issues for the Future, A Critical Review of Public Domain
Research and Other Materials 4-5 (2004).
22
See DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, INDIGENOUS FACT
SHEET § 2.8, http://www.atsia.gov.au/facts/docs/OIPC_FactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET].
23
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, AFTER ATSIC—
LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM? 17 (2005) [hereinafter LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?].
24
See id. at 17-18.
25
The Hawke Government held office from March 1983 to December 1991.
26
HON. JOHN HANNAFORD ET AL., IN THE HANDS OF THE REGIONS—A NEW ATSIC: REPORT OF THE
REVIEW OF THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION 16 (2003).
27
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 28-37.
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Legislative Compromises Permanently Hindered the Commission

The Hawke Government envisioned ATSIC as a major advance in the
administration of Indigenous affairs.28 The proposed legislation sought a
body combining representative and executive duties, administering the
Government’s Indigenous programs through a system of Regional Councils
and a national board (Commission) elected by Indigenous people.29
ATSIC’s guiding purpose was to ensure that Indigenous Australians
participated in decision-making processes on matters that affected them.30
This proposed body was controversial, combining as it did executive
and representative powers.31 Because ATSIC was seen by some as setting
up an alternate government, beyond the control of the Parliament, it
“suffered heavily at the hand of the Opposition party during the passage of
the Bill.”32 In fact, at the time, the bill to create ATSIC received the secondmost number of amendments in Australian history.33
Parliament finally passed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission Act 1989 (Cth.) (“ATSIC Act”) on November 4, 1989, two
years after it had been proposed.34 To maintain the desired perception of
greater Commission autonomy, the bill’s supporters agreed to several
measures—mainly increased accountability—that ensured ATSIC would
remain answerable to the Parliament.35 Years later, this rigid system of
accountability “was [often] cited as a serious (and unnecessary) impediment
to ATSIC’s operations, one which inhibited progress in the achievement of
better outcomes for Indigenous Australians.”36
28
See Angela Pratt & Scott Bennett, Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, The
End of ATSIC and the Future of Administration of Indigenous Affairs, Current Issues Brief No. 4 2004-05,
at 6 (Aug. 2004).
29
See id.
30
See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 16. According to section 3 of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth.), the objectives of the Commission were: 1) to ensure maximum
participation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in government policy formulation and
implementation; 2) to promote Indigenous self-management and self-sufficiency; 3) to further Indigenous
economic, social and cultural development; and 4) to ensure co-ordination of Commonwealth, state, territory
and local government policy affecting Indigenous people.
31
See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28; Palmer, supra note 21, at 6 (citing M. Dillon, Institutional
Structures in Indigenous Affairs, in SHOOTING THE BANKER: ESSAYS ON ATSIC AND SELF-DETERMINATION
94 (P. Sullivan ed., 1996)).
32
Palmer, supra note 21, at 6; see also Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28.
33
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 20; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 7.
34
See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth.); LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?,
supra note 23, at 20.
35
See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28.
36
Palmer, supra note 21, at 6.
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The resultant Commission retained the basic dual structure envisioned
by its proponents. ATSIC’s representative component consisted of 35
popularly elected Regional Councils and a National Board of
Commissioners elected by the Regional Councils.37 The administrative arm
was responsible for the delivery of ATSIC programs, the majority of which
targeted economic development and improved social and physical health.38
Nonetheless, over the next fifteen years, the concessions and amendments
made to the ATSIC Act would hinder the Commission and its goals.39
B.

Despite Its Successes, ATSIC Experienced Controversy and Became a
Political Scapegoat

ATSIC had many successes during its 15 years of existence, despite
much reporting to the contrary.40 ATSIC’s record of political participation,
representation, and innovation on behalf of Indigenous Australians was
unmatched by any mainstream agency.41 At the national level, ATSIC
achieved increased participation of Indigenous leaders in several national
policy bodies.42 Many programs administered by ATSIC focused clearly on
the needs of Indigenous people and brought appreciable gains—the
Community Development Employment Projects (“CDEP”) and the financial
agency Indigenous Business Australia among the most notable.43 In 200203, ATSIC funds built roughly 500 houses, renovated 760, and made 537
home loans, housing more than 1600 people.44 These are only a few
examples of ATSIC’s impact.45

37

See Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 8.
See id. at 8-9. Indigenous-specific programs in many areas, including social security, education,
health, and welfare were to be delivered by or through the auspices of other federal, state, and territory
governments. See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 14.
39
As a result of persistent criticism, ATSIC underwent several major changes during its life, not least
of which was the separation of the administrative arm into a separate agency. See LIFE IN THE
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 20; HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 18-20.
40
See Palmer, supra note 21, at 7-9.
41
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 38.
42
See id. Such policy bodies included, among others, the National Health and Medical Research
Council and the Australian Seafood Council. Id.
43
See id. at xvii. CDEP is the largest Indigenous program funded by the Government. It provides
employment and training opportunities to Indigenous participants in a range of activities that benefit both
individuals and their communities. Id. at 13.
44
See id. at 39.
45
Dr. Will Sanders identifies at least five areas of achievement for ATSIC: political participation of
Indigenous peoples, a national Indigenous voice increasingly independent of Government, distinctive and
culturally appropriate programs, using regional planning, and working with States and Territories. Will
Sanders, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, ATSIC's Achievements and Strengths:
38
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ATSIC also had its share of controversies and failings over the years,
though some were undeserved.46 One review of its history showed that
ATSIC had “laboured under much criticism, and despite many positive
statements by its senior representatives, ha[d] been forced into a defensive
position and . . . had to use time and resources to do so.”47 By the time of its
demise, only 20% of Indigenous Australians were participating in
elections.48 Several Commission members, including the Chairperson,
became embroiled in political corruption scandals.49 Moreover, a significant
2003 Government report documented the still pervasive poor living
standards of most Indigenous Australians, including a twenty year gap in life
expectancy.50 There had been seemingly little progress in the 13 years since
ATSIC’s creation.51
Accordingly, the Government took up a comprehensive review of
ATSIC.52 This report, released in 2003, documented widespread Indigenous
support for the concept of ATSIC and recommended that its national
representative structure be retained, although modified.53 The report’s main
recommendation was to move much of the decision-making into the hands
of the Regional Councils who were more connected to their constituencies.54

Implications for Institutional Reform (2004), at 1, http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/Publications/topical/
SandersATSICAchievement.pdf.
46
A common perception of ATSIC was that it controlled all Government services and programs that
affected Indigenous peoples and was wholly responsible for poor living standards. See LIFE IN THE
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 13. In health and education, for example, where Indigenous policy and
service delivery have been provided by mainstream agencies for many years, Indigenous Australian’s
circumstances continue to lag well behind those of other Australians. See id. at xvi-xvii.
47
Palmer, supra note 21, at 10.
48
LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 130. In fact, “in some regions of the country, the
relationship between ATSIC and the people it is designed to serve is tenuous at best.” HANNAFORD ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 28.
49
See, e.g., Tony Koch, Clark Facing Dismissal as ATSIC Chair, COURIER MAIL, July 16, 2003,
News, at 1; Kirsten Lawson, ATSIC Deputy Quits, Vows To Clear His Name, CANBERRA TIMES, June 26,
2003, at A2; Maria Moscaritolo, ATSIC Leaders Under Scrutiny, HERALD SUN, Mar. 22, 2003, News, at 22.
50
STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE PROVISION, OVERCOMING
INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE, KEY INDICATORS REPORT 2003 passim (2003) [hereinafter KEY INDICATORS
REPORT]. Indigenous Australians have a life expectancy 20 years less than other Australians; a higher rate
of disability resulting from environmental and trauma-related factors; significantly lower average incomes
and much higher unemployment rates; a significantly higher suicide rate; disproportionate victim rates from
crime; and a disproportionate prison population. Id. at xxiv-xxxiii.
51
See id. at v (“Notwithstanding many years of policy attention, this Report confirms that Indigenous
Australians continue to experience marked and widespread disadvantage.”).
52
Press Release, Minister Philip Ruddock, ATSIC Review Panel Announced (Nov. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.atsicreview.gov.au/media.html.
53
See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 8.
54
See id.
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Despite the recommendation of the 2003 Review, ATSIC could not
escape the rhetoric of blame and became the target of both sides of the 2004
Commonwealth election.55 Both the Labor Party and Coalition Government
singled out ATSIC as an impediment to change and a waste of tax-payer’s
money.56 The Howard government won reelection in 2004 and quickly
moved to abolish ATSIC by legislation.57 The Opposition referred the bill to
a Senate Committee for an investigation into the changes.58 In February
2005, the Senate Committee tabled its report,59 which, although extremely
critical of the legislation and the Government’s other reforms, did little to
stop the bill’s passage the following month.60 On March 24, 2005, ATSIC
ceased to exist.61
C.

Politics Aside, ATSIC Would Never Have Achieved Its Full Potential
Without Reforming Its Representative Structure

ATSIC suffered from at least two conditions that plagued its attempt
to address Indigenous inequity, both recognized by the 2003 Review.62 First,
ATSIC contained a dual system of accountability, uniquely responsible to
both its constituents and the Government.63 It was committed to the
ideology of self-determination while also being an institution of the
Government, responsible for the development and implementation of public
policy.64 ATSIC could not sufficiently separate these dual responsibilities in
both the administration of programs and the representation of interests.65
This unusual arrangement inhibited progress and was “primarily responsible
55

See Andrew Fraser, We’ll Abolish ATSIC, Says Labor Party, CANBERRA TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at
A3; Mark Phillips, PM to Make Aborigines Mainstream, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 1, 2004, Local, at 2.
56
See Few Would Mourn End of ATSIC, WEST AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 1, 2004, at 18. Both the Coalition
and Labor Party promised to abolish ATSIC if elected to run the government.
57
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill 2004, No. 04090 (Cth.).
58
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 1.
59
Id.
60
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 2005 (Cth.); see Press Release,
Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, ATSIC Bill
(Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0505.htm.
61
See Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs, ATSIC Now History—A Better Future Ahead for Indigenous Australians (Mar. 24,
2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0506.htm.
62
See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 5-7.
63
Palmer, supra note 21, at 6.
64
Id. at 12.
65
See id. at 5; LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 29; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 8.
In an attempt to cure these perceived conflicts of interest and possible corruption within the Commission, the
Government turned ATSIC’s administrative arm into a separate agency in 2003 known as Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Services (“ATSIS”). See id.
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for the numerous contradictions, conflicts, and dilemmas facing the
Commission.”66
Second, ATSIC’s power was concentrated in the National
Commission, sidelining the local communities as stakeholders as opposed to
directly involved parties.67 Representation at the community level had
always been considered impractical, and a formal electoral system was
imposed, substantially different from the grass roots approach some saw as
Moreover, ATSIC actually neglected
more culturally appropriate.68
community development in concentrating so heavily on program and service
delivery.69
In sum, ATSIC was a body unique in the world and the culmination of
thirty years of national Indigenous representation.70 The Commonwealth
government created ATSIC with much hype about its novelty and much
hope for its ability to help resolve the mounting issues affecting Indigenous
Australians.71 In spite of its novelty, ATSIC’s creators were wrong about its
ability to achieve substantial, widespread improvements for Indigenous
Australians. Although some explanations involve external forces on the
Commission, at least part of the problem involved the basic structure of
ATSIC as the embodiment of the Indigenous-State relationship.
NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS ARE THE WAY FORWARD FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND SETTLER GOVERNMENTS

III.

Australia is not alone in confronting issues of Indigenous inequality.
Around the world, Indigenous peoples and the settler states that displaced
them are struggling with how to resolve the myriad problems that arise from
the injustice and discrimination that typically accompany such
displacement.72 Recently scholars and politicians have championed the use
66

Palmer, supra note 21, at 6, 10.
See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS: TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 251
(Marcia Langton et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter HONOUR AMONG NATIONS].
68
See Palmer, supra note 21, at 6 (citing H. C. Coombs, Towards a National Aboriginal Congress, at
18-22 (extracts from a report to the Hon. Clyde Holding, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, April 1984)
(1986)); HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 29.
69
Palmer, supra note 21, at 12.
70
See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 16; Pratt & Bennett, supra note 28, at 6.
71
See GERRY HAND, MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, POLICY STATEMENT, FOUNDATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE 1-3 (1987).
72
See generally STUDY ON TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN STATES AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, FINAL REPORT BY MIGUEL ALFONSO MARTÍNEZ, SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR, U.N. Commission for Human Rights, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20(1999) [hereinafter U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES] (examining the origins, contemporary
67
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of negotiated agreements as the best way to achieve a peaceful, workable,
and mutually beneficial solution to these problems.73
A.

Agreements with Indigenous Peoples Have Been Used Throughout
History

Agreements between Indigenous peoples and settler states can take
many forms and use different names, but are by no means a new concept.74
From the beginnings of European expansion into the New World through the
era of colonialism, European settlers consistently relied on emerging
concepts of international law to form treaties with Indigenous polities.75
This system of treaty making “developed ad hoc to justify conquest, trade,
Eventually
safe passage and other exigencies of imperialism.”76
encapsulated by such colonial regimes, and subsequently, settler states,
Indigenous peoples also resorted to negotiation for their rights of
sovereignty, as well as the recognition and redress of injustices.77 However,
as the need for alliances for security purposes receded and the settler groups
began to recognize and rationalize their dominance, the use of treaties
waned.78
Interestingly, Australia never witnessed such historical treaty making.
Various attempts by colonial and post-Federation agents to establish
agreements with particular Indigenous leaders failed because the colonial
governments deemed the Aboriginals incapable of recognition at law.79 For
these governments’ ideological, political, demographic, and geographical
ambitions, “it was more advantageous to regard Aboriginal people as
unworthy of treaty like arrangements than to make commitments that might

significance, and potential value of concluding treaties, agreements, and other constructive arrangements
between Indigenous peoples and States).
73
See generally HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67 (describing and analyzing a diversity of
treaty and agreement-making instances between Indigenous peoples and others in settler states).
74
See Marcia Langton & Lisa Palmer, Treaties, Agreement Making and the Recognition of
Indigenous Customary Polities, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 34, 40.
75
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 4 (“The history of treaty making in the ‘New World’
extended over 400 years for the British and French, and over 500 years for the Spanish, Dutch and
Portuguese, with divergent outcomes throughout the colonies. . . . The reach of the European powers into
the “New World” brought new peoples and civilisations within the ambit of a new international code of
European regulation.”).
76
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
77
Id. at 1.
78
See U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 190-200.
79
Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 41.
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have become obstacles to the unfettered land appropriation in colonial
Australia.”80
B.

Scholars Endorse a Modern Approach to Agreement Making as a
Means of Addressing Indigenous Inequities

In spite of the often unjust results of these historical agreements,
academics, Indigenous leaders, business leaders, and politicians alike,
champion a modern form of contractualism (or agreement making) meant to
rearrange the Indigenous-State relationship for the benefit of all parties.81
For the purposes of this Comment, contractualism refers to the
language and practice of contract—the ordering of relations by negotiated
agreement.82 In the traditional legal sense, a contract refers to an exchange
of consideration and the establishment of a legally enforceable obligation—
an obligation which flows from the free choice of the parties.83 More
specifically, a contractual relationship should involve: 1) parties with
autonomy in their roles, 2) the identification of specific issues, 3) agreement
or free consent to the terms, 4) transparency, and 5) consequences for action
or inaction.84 Contractualism is also generally characterized by the
principles of choice, voice, participation, and consent.85
Modern contractualism is not much different. Although historically
confined to the realm of liberal political theory, commercial law, and
economic exchange, today the language and practice of contractualism are
“used to manage diverse problems in public administration, employment,
schooling, ordering of private (marriage or marriage-type) relationships,
women’s rights and minority rights.”86 In studying these newer realms,
80

Id.
See, U.N. STUDY ON TREATIES, supra note 72, at paras. 260-63; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh,
Evaluating Agreements between Indigenous People and Resource Developers, in HONOUR AMONG
NATIONS, supra note 67, at 303, 303-04; Bruce Harvey, Rio Tinto’s Agreement Making in Australia in a
Context of Globalisation, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 237, 240; Stefan Matiation,
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RESOURCES J. 204, 205 (2002).
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See Barbara Sullivan, Mapping Contract, in THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM? 1, 1 (Glyn Davis et al.
eds., 1997).
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See id., at 2; see also Patrick S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q.
REV. 193, 194-5 (1978).
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See Alex Matheson, The Impact of Contracts on Public Management in New Zealand, in THE NEW
CONTRACTUALISM?, supra note 82, at 164, 168-69.
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Zealand, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 113, 118 (2002).
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See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 1.
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scholars have attempted to redefine the basic elements of contractualism.87
One political scientist describes four necessary conditions for modern
contractualism: 1) obligation based on individualized consent, 2) explicit
dialogue between the parties which informs that consent, 3) negotiation
based on mutual adjustment on the terms of the contract, and 4)
accountability for actions based on the first three conditions.88 These
requirements do not materially differ from previous conceptions of the
contract model, although they certainly involve important new concepts.89
Therefore, modern contractualism refers less to a change in the process of
making contracts, than to the diversity of issues to which that process is
applied.90
When applied to the realm of Indigenous-State relations, the process
of negotiating agreements provides a model approach to achieving
Indigenous self-determination within the realities of international law and
politics in the 21st century.91 Those realities dictate that if Indigenous
peoples are to peacefully and effectively realize self-determination, they will
most likely have to exercise it within existing State structures and orders.92
Scholars, and others, support negotiated agreements because they allow
Indigenous peoples to contractualize the nature of their relationship with the
State, thereby opening up opportunities to “(re)establish and (re)orient
Indigenous-State relations” upon those principles of choice, voice,
participation, and consent.93

87

See Gaby Ramia, The “New Contractualism,” Social Protection and the Yeatman Thesis, 38
J. SOC. 49, 50 (2002) (Austl.).
88
See Sullivan, supra note 82, at 6 (citing Anna Yeatman, Interpreting Contemporary
Contractualism, in JONATHAN BOSTON, THE STATE UNDER CONTRACT (Jonathan Boston ed., 1995)).
89
For example, modern contractualism tends to radically disaggregate and individualize governance
into a series of contractual relationships, as opposed to the generic “social contract” historically associated
with governance. See id., at 6-7.
90
See Buick, supra note 85, at 117-18; Sullivan, supra note 82, at 6-7; Ramia, supra note 87, at 51.
91
Buick, supra note 85, at 114.
92
Id. at 113; see also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2d. ed.
2004) (“It is generally assumed that [international] norms [of self-determination and human rights], like
indigenous self-determination more generally, will ordinarily be applied within the frameworks of existing
states.”). Anaya also notes that the tendency to equate self-determination with independent statehood has
prevented widespread acceptance of the notion that self-determination, as an international legal principle,
applies to Indigenous peoples. See id. at 7-9.
93
Buick, supra note 85, at 118. Indeed, experience has shown that agreements between Indigenous
peoples and settler states have avoided much conflict. As such, “agreement making has become a preferred,
sometimes unavoidable part of the political and economic landscapes of settler states in which Indigenous
and local peoples make their case for restitution of their inherent rights as peoples.” HONOUR AMONG
NATIONS, supra note 67, at 25.
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Negotiated Agreements Promise Sovereignty and Justice for
Indigenous Peoples

At their core, Indigenous peoples’ claims against settler states revolve
around self-determination.94 This can be broken down into two distinct
demands: the demand for sovereignty over their own affairs and the demand
for justice.95 The concept of sovereignty is not uniform among Indigenous
groups, but generally involves self-determination of membership, religious
practice, child rearing, economics, and perhaps most importantly, land use.96
As for justice, Indigenous groups generally seek some or all of the
following: reconciliation (and perhaps reparations) for past injustices, the
means to cure ongoing occurrences of injustice, and a commitment and plan
to prevent future injustices.97
According to many commentators, the mere process or act of
negotiating agreements contributes greatly to the goals of sovereignty,
regardless of the outcome.98 The negotiation and agreement process
presupposes each party to be sovereign in their own right and equals in
relation to each other, despite potential or real disparities in bargaining
power.99 By engaging in the contractual process, each party is exercising its
choice to make a contract and its power to give or withhold consent to the
terms.100
The process of contractualism also fulfils Indigenous goals for
obtaining justice by employing and adhering to principles of choice, voice,
participation, and consent during the negotiating process.101 The power of
this process is that, “while it goes some way towards making amends for
94

See ANAYA, supra note 92, at 97.
Buick, supra note 85, at 119. Buick notes that scholar Garth Nettheim identified ten classes of
claims for self-determination advanced by Indigenous peoples since the 1970s. Id. at 114, n.3. However,
for his argument supporting contractualism, Buick consolidates these claims into two types—sovereignty
and justice—despite the danger of overgeneralization. Id. (citing JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 4-5 (1995)). This Comment adopts Buick’s generalization of
Indigenous self-determination into sovereignty and justice. Accord ANAYA, supra note 92, at 103-110
(distinguishing between the substantive and remedial aspects of Indigenous self-determination).
96
See ANAYA, supra note 92, at 129 (noting that Indigenous norms regarding self-determination
generally include concerns over cultural integrity, social welfare and development, self-government, and
land and resources).
97
See Buick, supra note 85, at 119.
98
See id. at 120; Lisa Strelein, Symbolism and Function: From Native Title to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Self-Government, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 189, 190; Parry Agius et
al., Comprehensive Native Title Negotiations in South Australia, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note
67, at 203, 203.
99
Buick, supra note 85, at 120.
100
Id.
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past injustices, it also redefines future interactions between victims and
perpetrators and attempts to negotiate improvements on existing social
injustices.”102 Without good process, the parties will not have ownership of
their agreement. A paper agreement will exist, “but relationships on the
ground—and the structures and processes of governance—will remain
reflective of historical injustice.”103 Process is particularly important
because its broader lessons can create justice elsewhere, whereas substantive
issues are often tailored to the particular parties.104
Nevertheless, the substantive outcomes of negotiated agreements also
aid in fulfilling Indigenous demands for sovereignty and justice. The actual
terms of the agreement will identify and define the parties and the areas of
their sovereignty, and spell out their sovereign rights and duties within the
contractual relationship.105 At present, this will usually be a limited form of
sovereignty for the Indigenous party, but this does not necessarily connote
inferiority: “As arrangements elsewhere in the world demonstrate, there is
compatibility between a nation’s sovereignty and a state’s sovereignty. This
is the essence of federalism.”106
Altogether, as long as the procedural contractual principles of choice,
voice, participation, and consent are upheld, an agreement embodies
substantive justice because it represents “what has been contracted for,
participated in, negotiated upon, and consented to by the parties.”107 Such
an agreement cannot reasonably or justly be rejected by any party to that
agreement.108
D.

Native Title Negotiations Exemplify the Benefits of the Contractual
Process with Regards to Sovereignty

Australia has already to some extent witnessed the varied and mutual
benefits of Indigenous-State contractualism through Native Title
determinations.109 In 1992, the High Court finally recognized the existence
102

HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 1.
Agius et al., supra note 98, at 204.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 16; see also Sean Brennan et al., “Sovereignty” and
Its Relevance to Treaty-Making Between Indigenous Peoples and Australian Governments, 26 SYDNEY L.
REV. 307, 309 (2004) (concluding that the concept of sovereignty need not be an impediment to treatymaking in Australia).
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Buick, supra note 85, at 120.
108
Id. at 121.
109
See Press Release, National Native Title Tribunal, National Trend Gathering Momentum with
200th Agreement (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.nntt.gov.au/media/1128302683_3736.html. Other instances
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of “Native Title” to land, giving Indigenous Australians significant legal
power over their ancient land base for the first time.110 The next year,
Parliament passed the Native Title Act, 1993111 (“NTA”), which created
procedures for determining where Native Title exists and where it has been
wholly or partially extinguished.112 One of the underlying principles of the
NTA, which is more evident (at least in terms of legislative language) since
its amendment in 1998,113 is the emphasis on agreement making as the
preferred method of dealing with Native Title issues, and on mediation as a
means of encouraging agreements.114 This emphasis “has provided a
platform on which much negotiation, both Native Title and non-Native Title,
has been built.”115 For the first time, large groups of Indigenous Australians
are engaged in a process that recognizes their jurisdiction.116
Native Title agreements have cultivated the exercise of previously
suppressed Indigenous sovereignty such that the process itself is an exercise
in self-determination.117 These negotiations and agreements also have the
potential to protect social, cultural, and economic interests.118 This often
revitalizes the rural and remote areas in which Indigenous peoples constitute

besides Native Title certainly exist. For example, in October 2001, the Western Australia Government
signed a Statement of Commitment with Indigenous peoples in that state, focusing on recognition of the
continuing rights and responsibilities of Indigenous Australians, legislative protection of Indigenous rights,
and regional and local approaches to address issues that impact Indigenous communities. The Statement
formalizes its reforms through agreements. See Strelein, supra note 98, at 196.
110
Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 2 (Austl.). Prior to Mabo, Australian common law
held that the continent was terra nullius (no man’s land) at the time of Federation. Id. at 32-34. Negotiation
and agreements making was not unknown prior to the famous Mabo decision; before 1992, statutory land
rights schemes and, to a lesser extent, heritage legislation both provided a framework for some negotiation
and agreement making. HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 17.
111
Native Title Act, 1993 (Cth.).
112
One commentator argues that the NTA, as interpreted by the High Court of Australia, significantly
constrained the breadth of Native Title as envisioned by the Mabo decision. Noel Pearson, Land is
Susceptible of Ownership, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 83, 83.
113
See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 § 24c (Cth.) (creating Indigenous Land Use Agreements;
consolidated into Native Title Act, 1993).
114
Graeme Neate, Agreement Making and the Native Title Act, in HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra
note 67, at 176, 179. As part of the 1998 amendments to the NTA, the Indigenous Land Use Agreement
(“ILUA”) provisions sought to meet the needs of smaller ventures for agreements with Indigenous
communities. The ILUA provisions also recognized the desire on the part of commercial and Indigenous
interests to be able to deal directly with each other in relation to particular projects, removing government
entirely from some negotiations. Strelein, supra note 98, at 193.
115
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 16-17.
116
Id.
117
Agius et al., supra note 98, at 215. Native title stimulated a culture of agreement making, “and it is
this culture, within and outside the Native Title process, that begins to engage Aboriginal polities and
Aboriginal jurisdiction.” HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 20.
118
See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252.
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significant majorities.119 Moreover, this modern agreement making allows
the recognition of Indigenous Australian polities that statutes and common
law have not.120 Indeed, one scholar urges that the success of the Native
Title system be evaluated by both the legal conclusions of Native Title as
well as its place in the recognition of Indigenous self-government.121
However, Native Title negotiation can also go further than mere
recognition of the traditional scope of Indigenous authority. The process of
negotiating Native Title has resulted in the extension of the jurisdiction of
“surviving Aboriginal customary polities into postcolonial commercial and
legal domains.”122 This provides mutual gain in that the State or industry
gains access to resources in Indigenous territory, while the Indigenous
people extend their property based “customary rights” into the modern
economic and political sphere.123 Accordingly, there is broad and politically
bipartisan support for agreement making, and Indigenous peoples,
government, and industry are devoting substantial financial and other
resources to the negotiation of agreements.124
E.

To Ensure the Success of Agreement Making, a Number of Challenges
Must Be Overcome

Agreement making is not without its shortfalls, especially in the
context of Indigenous-State relations. Poor leadership, unequal bargaining
positions, cultural bias, and failure to plan for implementation and
enforcement can sabotage the process and outcomes of negotiated
agreements. None of these drawbacks, however, is insurmountable or
unavoidable.

119

Id.
Id. at 13.
121
Strelein, supra note 98, at 189-90. For Strelein, Native Title is important in Australia’s legal and
political structures because it is a measure of Australia’s ability to accommodate the rights of Indigenous
peoples. Id. For Indigenous Australians, “it is not merely a form of title: it is a fundamental recognition of
the distinct identity and special place of the first peoples.” Id.
122
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 13. For a specific example of how the evolving
recognition of Native Title has nurtured a distinctive approach to agreement making involving new sorts of
relationships, co-operative exploration of a wide range of issues, and emphasis on process as a vehicle for
exercising Aboriginal self-determination, see Agius et al., supra note 98, at 203.
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Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 49.
124
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 303-04.
120

FEBRUARY 2006

1.

AUSTRALIA’S NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

281

Indigenous Parties Must Have Leadership and Capacity, and
Bargaining Positions Must Be Maintained

To ensure sound contractual relations and outcomes, Indigenous
peoples must possess leadership skills and be conversant in the language and
practice of contracts.125 Modern contractualism tends to disaggregate and
individualize governance into a series of contractual relationships.126 Thus,
to operate effectively within such a framework, individuals127 must be able
“to make rational choices about their own interests, and be able to
understand, negotiate, and adhere to contracts”—they must have capacity.128
For Indigenous peoples engaged in negotiations with a settler state, capacity
implicates the governance abilities and cultural authority of Indigenous
governing institutions.129
Indigenous governing institutions vary in capacity. For some,
capacity may not exist at all—many groups have not managed to maintain
their traditional organization in the face of colonialism.130 In this situation,
outsiders must encourage and support the creation of culturally appropriate
and effective representative structures to ensure mutually beneficial
agreements. This may prove easier than imagined given that “[a] people do
not desist from their political aspirations merely on the grounds of doctrinal
denial of their existence or their capacity to engage politically with external
entities.”131 However, appropriate funding and accountability measures
should be a part of such encouragement and support.
Beyond negotiating skills, the legal and political power behind
Indigenous groups plays an important role. Any negotiation proceeds based
on the bargaining position of each party—a position often dictated by the
legal rights of those parties and the political atmosphere of the time. The ad
hoc nature of individual agreements does little for the larger Indigenous
community’s position; any agreements will only be binding on those parties
and will not advance the legal position of Indigenous peoples in general.132
In addition, the terms of many privately negotiated agreements are
confidential, providing little guidance for similarly-situated Indigenous
125
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communities as to what they can or should expect from agreements.133
Accordingly, maintaining the bargaining position of Indigenous parties and
ensuring they are adequately resourced for the exercise are crucial factors to
achieving outcomes that will have lasting benefit to Indigenous
Australians.134
Despite the shortcomings of the Native Title Act,135 both the
Government and NGOs have experience in building capacity within
Indigenous groups through the Native Title system. The Government
created the National Native Title Tribunal to, among other things, facilitate
mediation relating to Native Title and assist people in negotiating
Indigenous Land Use Agreements (“ILUAs”).136 The Act also provides for
the recognition of Native Title representative bodies around the country.137
In South Australia, an NGO helped create local representative structures
(“Committees”) for Indigenous groups involved in a state-wide settlement of
Native Title claims. These Committees proved important to the Native Title
groups in providing an appropriate and accountable avenue for claim
management that was reflective of the group’s kinship and traditional
decision-making processes.138 This type of support for nascent Indigenous
governance and capacity is essential for the success of agreement-making.
On the other hand, the Native Title system in Australia may suffer
from severe unequal bargaining positions. Noel Pearson, an Indigenous
leader in Queensland, argues that despite the success of ILUAs, the
negotiation process is still inherently one-sided.139 Under the current Native
Title system, non-Indigenous parties are allowed to oppose claims for Native
Title even though they have no rights or interests that are vulnerable. All of
their rights and interests are guaranteed by the common law and by
validating legislation and the Attorney-General pays for their legal costs;
thus, they have nothing to lose by refusing to consent to a finding of Native
Title when the system assumes most claims can be settled by mediation and
133

See id. at 449.
Id. at 448.
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One author notes that the NTA does not provide for any formal recognition of Aboriginal selfgovernment, and it does not anticipate the resources that are required for effective Aboriginal governance
associated with Native Title. See Agius et al., supra note 98, at 217. That said, finding the resources
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negotiation.140 Not only does such unequal positioning limit the potential
outcomes for Indigenous peoples; it also provides less incentive for one
party to negotiate in the first place.
While this may be an extreme example, contractualism can still be
beneficial even when the bargaining position of Indigenous peoples is
particularly weak. If parties are willing to set aside seemingly intractable
disputes over matters like sovereignty, “then practical mechanisms and
creative wording contained in skilfully negotiated treaties and agreements
can allow the focus of negotiations to shift to defined and achievable goals
of mutual concern while at the same time preserving each party’s legal
position.”141
2.

Accommodating Competing Discourses Must Defeat Euro-centric
Domination

Some critics argue that contractualism involves a Euro-centric
discourse and overly economistic model which inherently disfavors
Indigenous peoples.142 Such criticism contends that contractual principles
are altogether foreign to Indigenous peoples—a notion based in part on the
historically unjust outcomes of treaties and agreements.143 Conflicting
Indigenous-State discourses also support the idea that Indigenous peoples
are at a cultural disadvantage. Today States often seek to silence the past
and tame the future of Indigenous-State relations, hoping to achieve a
definitive result and move forward.144 By contrast, Indigenous discourse
seeks to reestablish and reorient the relationship with the State while
maintaining continuity with the past.145 Given this apparent disjuncture of
discourse, the Euro-centric nature of contractualism might allow the State to
force its own view on the other, making the agreement an instrument of
domination, rather than of coexistence.146

140

Id. at 85-86.
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These concerns are misplaced. Initially, building capacity among
Indigenous leaders will help avert the claimed disfavor. But moreover, there
is little support for the assertion that Indigenous peoples in the past did not
understand the nature of the relationships they were forming through
treaties.147 The systems of commerce and trade that gave rise to contractual
principles are not modern or even European/American creations and “have
been ‘part of the human condition for at least as long as Homo sapiens has
been a species.’”148
Unfortunately, “[d]ispossession and disruption, international and
domestic laws, and the never-ending expansion of the market and modern
urban settlement into Indigenous domains, have all had an impact on the
capacity of Indigenous peoples to sustain ancient livelihoods and
lifeways.”149 This does not mean that Indigenous peoples are not willing to
change. In fact, today, Indigenous peoples often “want to benefit from the
economic projects that consume their resource base, and moreover want to
develop economically in their own right.”150 This is demonstrated by the
wide range of agreements, covering an immense breadth and scope, between
Indigenous groups and others in Australia.151 Although agreement-making
has undoubtedly been a tool of European domination of Indigenous peoples
in the past, “today it [can] become a means of facilitating that encounter on
the principles of consent and choice, fairness and mutual respect.”152

147
Buick, supra note 85, at 127-28. “[W]hat they misunderstood, if anything, were the frequently
changing and contradictory intentions of the State parties, the trickery employed by these parties in the
process and product of contractualism, and the underlying absence of good faith bargaining. That was not
something to be immediately gleaned from negotiations or the text of the agreement, but rather from the
course of the subsequent history of relations.” Id. at 128.
148
Buick, supra note 85, at 127 (quoting MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 200 (1997)).
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HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 25.
150
Id.
151
These include agreements relating to mineral resources, education and health service delivery,
Native Title determinations, local government, arts and tourism, national parks and environmental
management. HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 252. Similarly, though ILUAs were conceived
as a means for providing contractual security for small commercial interests, this has not stopped Indigenous
Australians from pushing the limits of the ILUA process: “Native title claimants in South Australia, for
example, have entered into direct negotiations with the South Australian Government and peak industry
bodies under the ILUA process to negotiate a ‘state wide comprehensive settlement’ of native title issues,
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supra note 98, at 194.
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Implementation and Enforcement of Agreements Must Be Arranged at
the Outset

Often parties to an agreement concentrate exclusively on the goals
they hope to achieve. However, “the mere fact of an agreement does not of
itself guarantee equitable outcomes for Indigenous parties.”153 The
prospects for success are greatly influenced by the degree to which
agreements contain the means for their own implementation and
enforcement.154 Drafting clear, specific provisions is important155; but
effective implementation and enforcement also echoes the call for
organizational capacity of all parties to sustain their commitments.156
Similarly, the enforceability of such agreements must be assured.
Many historical agreements failed to protect Indigenous interests because
they had no means of effective enforcement, and where an enforcement
mechanism existed, Indigenous peoples often had negotiated agreements
(re)interpreted in favor of powerful non-Indigenous interests.157 Modern
agreements must be structured so that should implementation or
performance under the agreement become a problem, the harmed party can
avail itself of the benefits of the legal order within which the contractual
relationship operates.158
Some authors argue that the problems of implementation and
enforcement implicate a party’s change of will, and not a failing of the
process of contractualism itself.159 Nonetheless, a culture of agreementmaking can induce Indigenous reliance on the good faith of the State. If the
State has a change of will, an agreement might in fact leave an Indigenous
Accordingly, implementation and
party worse off than before.160
enforcement are essential to successful outcomes from negotiated
agreements.
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Although Alternatives to Agreement Making Should Be Utilized, Only
Contractualism Provides a Comprehensive Solution to Indigenous
Inequities

Despite these potential shortfalls of Indigenous-State agreement
making, an overview of the alternatives reinforces the wisdom of using such
agreements in the modern world. For example, physical resistance has
obvious consequences, including death and destruction of property. As
perhaps a more acceptable alternative, Indigenous groups have the option of
refusing to bargain for rights, and instead pursuing such rights in the settler
state legal/political system. Common law courts, however, have generally
been unresponsive to the needs of Indigenous communities.161 “Although
test cases are necessary to resolve outstanding legal questions (to create a
clearer legal landscape in which to negotiate), . . . [a] litigated outcome is
likely to be more costly (in financial, personal and temporal terms) than a
mediated outcome, and the issues that are resolved are likely to be
narrower.”162 Indigenous groups as well as judges have articulated this
concern over the costs of litigation.163 Only contractualism provides a
peaceful, coherent, and effective framework for Indigenous peoples to
participate in, and consent to, the nature and terms of coexistence with
States in their quest for self-determination.164
In Australia, alternative methods of achieving self-determination are
undoubtedly important arrows in the quiver. Noel Pearson of the Northern
Territory has argued that both radical and moderate strategies must be used
in order to secure results.165 However, the existing tools, including Native
Title negotiations, have limitations—some practical, others going much
161
The Mabo decision and subsequent Native Title cases in Australia are a good example. For a
discussion on the role of the courts and Native Title, see Carlos Scott López, Reformulating Native Title in
Mabo’s Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 21 (2003). See also Geoffrey Robert Schiveley, Note, Negotiation and Native Title: Why
Common Law Courts Are Not Proper Fora for Determining Native Title Land Issues, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 427 (2000).
162
Neate, supra note 114, at 183. Indeed, experience has shown that these typical litigation costs are
exaggerated in Native Title cases. See id.
163
See O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 303-04 (“[Indigenous s]upport for agreement making
results from a conviction that in comparison to the alternatives (essentially litigation or a resolution involving
political conflict), negotiation of agreements is less time consuming, less costly, and more likely to permit
‘win-win’ situations that allow benefits to be channeled to Indigenous people without creating a backlash
from competing interests that have incurred a commensurate loss.”); Neate, supra note 114, at 182 (“There
have been some very strong statements from superior courts about the importance of agreement making.”).
164
See Buick, supra note 85, at 119, 122; McHugh, supra note 142, at 214.
165
Strelein, supra note 98, at 199 (quoting Noel Pearson, Aboriginal Law and Colonial Law Since
Mabo, in ABORIGINAL SELF DETERMINATION IN AUSTRALIA 157 (Christine Fletcher ed., 1994)).
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deeper, to the heart of the colonial relationship.166 Inconsistent government
responses exacerbate these limitations.167 As such, some scholars have
recently called for coordinated Indigenous-State negotiations covering a
wider range of issues, whereby Indigenous Australians can address issues
not as a corporate interest, but as a collective, self-governing, and sovereign
interest.168 The New Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs attempt to answer
that call.
IV.

IN EMBRACING THE MODEL OF CONTRACTUALISM, THE NEW
ARRANGEMENTS HOLD MUCH PROMISE FOR INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS

The Government recently embarked on a new course in Indigenous
affairs. The New Arrangements are, in part, a response to the crisis of
underdevelopment that is emerging because of increasing population growth
and the failure of service delivery to meet the needs of Indigenous
peoples.169 The Government hopes “to improve the outcomes and
opportunities and hopes of Indigenous people in areas of health, education
and employment.”170 Empirically and rhetorically, these New Arrangements
are an innovative and promising approach to eradicating Indigenous inequity
and injustice in Australia.
A.

The New Arrangements Seek Better Government Coordination and
Empowerment of Indigenous Communities

The New Arrangements consist of an entirely new administrative
structure and appear to be based on two fundamental ideas: better
coordination of the part of governments and agencies; and, most important,
engaging and empowering Indigenous communities to run their own affairs
and find their own solutions to problems through negotiated agreements.171
166
Id. For example, agreement making has had wavering success with respect to the elimination of
racial discrimination and protection of copyright; this is due largely to the cultural biases and entrenched
racism that continue to permeate settler societies’ responses to the recognition and protection of Indigenous
rights and interests. HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 253.
167
Strelein, supra note 98, at 199.
168
Id. at 200. In looking past Native Title, one author suggests that the effectiveness of these
agreements could be enhanced by moving beyond a sole focus and developing better links to the whole-ofgovernment decision-making processes as this relates to a range of other key social and economic indicators.
See HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 23.
169
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 251; see also COMMONWEALTH GRANTS
COMMISSION, REPORT ON INDIGENOUS FUNDING, at xiv-xvii (2001).
170
Prime Minister John Howard, supra note 17.
171
Fred Chaney, Common Ground Key to Moving Ahead, TALKING NATIVE TITLE, Dec. 2004, at 4;
see also NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1.
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To facilitate the coordination of government services, the New
Arrangements implement several structural changes. First, Indigenous
specific programs formerly administered by ATSIC are now administered by
Government mainstream agencies under a “whole-of-government”
approach.172 For example, ATSIC’s largest program, CDEP, is now run by
the Commonwealth Department of Employment and Workplace Relations.173
The ATSIC employees who ran the CDEP program were moved to the
mainstream agency office. Second, at the national level a Ministerial
Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs (“Taskforce”) now provides “leadership and
strategic direction” for Commonwealth Indigenous policy.174 The Taskforce
is advised by a Secretaries’ Group and a National Indigenous Council
(“NIC”), an appointed body of Indigenous Australians chosen for their
expertise and experience in a range of policy areas.175 Third, at the regional
level the Government established thirty Indigenous Coordination Centres
(“ICCs”) throughout the country, usually in the locations of former ATSIC
Regional Councils, which are managed nationally by an Office of
Indigenous Policy Coordination (“OIPC”).176 The ICCs are the backbone of
the New Arrangements, intended to be the community and regional level
coordinator of all Government activity and the single point of Government
contact for Indigenous peoples and communities.177 ICCs manage the
delivery of most of the Government’s Indigenous programs and work with
local Indigenous communities to develop innovative, flexible responses to
local needs through negotiated agreements.178
The more promising transformation that the New Arrangements bring
to Indigenous Affairs is the focus on local Indigenous representation and
empowerment and regional planning. This is accomplished partly through
172
NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 1, 9. “Whole-of-government”
means “all government policies and funds must be coordinated and used efficiently and strategically in
cooperation with local communities.” Id. at 2.
173
Id. at 22.
174
Id. at 1, 11-12.
175
Id. at 12-13, 27-30. The NIC is required it to provide expert advice to the Government on
improving the socio-economic status of Indigenous Australians, including improvements in Government
program performance and service delivery. Id. at 12. The Council advises on the appropriateness and
effectiveness of programs within the Indigenous community and promotes constructive relations between
government and Indigenous people, communities, and organizations. Id. It is also responsible for alerting
the Government to current and emerging policy issues. Id.
176
Id. at 15-16.
177
Id. at 5; ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER SOCIAL JUSTICE COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
JUSTICE REPORT 2004, at 81 (2004) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004], available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/sjreport04/index.html.
178
NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 15; INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET,
supra note 22, § 3.6.
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Negotiated between
Shared Responsibility Agreements (“SRAs”).179
Indigenous communities and the Government, SRAs address the needs and
desires identified by Indigenous groups themselves.180 SRAs detail what all
parties will contribute to achieve desired outcomes; in exchange for
Commonwealth services and investment, Indigenous groups must offer
commitments and undertake changes that benefit their community.181 The
New Arrangements also call for “real partnerships” between governments,
communities, NGOs, and the private sector as part of this shared
responsibility.182 To facilitate SRA negotiations, the Government has
pledged to identify new representative structures among Indigenous
communities and negotiate with those entities as they arise.183
In addition to localized SRAs, Regional Partnership Agreements
(“RPAs”) between Indigenous representatives and Government are another
focus of the New Arrangements. RPAs allow for a coherent Government
intervention strategy across a region, elimination of overlaps and gaps, and
promotion of coordination to meet regional priorities.184 RPAs may also
incorporate State and Territory commitments, as they play a vital role in
servicing Indigenous Australians.185 The RPAs and ICCs bring a major shift
in focus to the regional level, recognizing that different communities have
widely different needs and resources.
B.

The New Arrangements Are an Effective Implementation of the
Principles of Contractualism and Will Create More Meaningful
Outcomes for Indigenous Peoples Compared to ATSIC

The New Arrangement’s emphasis on negotiated agreements by itself
demonstrates an endorsement of contractual principles. However, five
principles also underpin the New Arrangements—collaboration, flexibility,
regional need, accountability, and leadership186—and each echoes the
contractualist principles discussed earlier.187 Contractualism allows parties
to have: 1) a collaborative, as opposed to adversarial, relationship;
2) flexibility in designing solutions; 3) the ability to tailor the terms to
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 18.
INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.8.
NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 18.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 17; INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.2.
NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 5-7.
See supra Part III.B.
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specific needs; 4) defined and specific areas of accountability; and 5) an
opportunity to exercise self-determination and leadership.
These principles, and the New Arrangements in general, should be
seen as an attempt to embody the notion that negotiated agreements achieve
the best results for Indigenous peoples. They flow from a belief that those
people whose rights are at stake should be the decision makers in
negotiations, with capacity to hold representatives and advisors
accountable.188 In other words, the Indigenous groups should be the ones
making decisions about outcomes, rather than having to accept outcomes
negotiated by others.189
The New Arrangements have real potential for fulfilling the goals set
for, but not achieved by, ATSIC.190 First, in terms of political involvement
and self-government, Indigenous Australian communities will be creating
their own Indigenous representative models under the New Arrangements.
These may be at the community, clan, or family level, or may even
approximate the former ATSIC Regional Councils; but whatever model is
chosen, it will be chosen by the community and not imposed by the
Commonwealth government. Second, such representation, coupled with the
proven benefits of negotiated agreements, should further Indigenous
economic, social, and cultural development.
Finally, ATSIC’s last
objective—government service coordination—is infused through every
aspect of the New Arrangements.
Beyond the stated ATSIC goals, the local focus of the New
Arrangements acknowledges the diversity of Indigenous Australians, and
thereby accommodates the needs, demands, and potential of each
community more than ATSIC ever did.191 Additionally, because the SRAs
involve Indigenous peoples “as consensual parties, rather than as
‘stakeholders,’” the terms and conditions of the agreements will help build a
future relationship that is inherently more just than the imposed
administrative solutions to which Indigenous Australians have been
subjected since colonization.192
While ATSIC was itself a unique and giant leap forward for
Indigenous self-determination, in the end its structure was not as responsive
to Indigenous communities as it needed to be. ATSIC had no recognized
188
189
190
191
192

Agius et al., supra note 98, at 216.
Id.
See supra note 29.
See Strelein, supra note 98, at 200.
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 251.

FEBRUARY 2006

AUSTRALIA’S NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

291

local representative structures and even the Regional Councils lacked the
power to make program decisions for their regions. By using agreement
making at the local level, the New Arrangements present an opportunity for
Indigenous Australian communities to cautiously take steps towards full
self-determination.193
The New Arrangements, however, are not without their problems and
inconsistencies. As of June 2005, more than 70 SRAs have been recorded
by ICCs.194 As shown in the Introduction above, however, some agreements
have been controversial. Many observers have understandably attacked
such agreements as paternalistic and assimilationist.195 The concept of
“shared responsibility,” while meant to include Indigenous Peoples in
making sure their communities succeed, unfortunately carries the
connotation that they are somehow responsible for their own
disenfranchised condition. In addition, all the assurances and good
intentions of the New Arrangements are mere rhetoric at this point. The real
test will be whether the Government follows through with funding and
implementation of its promises.
THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO TAKE STEPS TO BUTTRESS THE NEW
ARRANGEMENTS

V.

The Government transitioned to the New Arrangements hastily and
unilaterally, creating tension among the Indigenous community and
undermining the potential for success of its new program. Moreover, the
uncompromising move appears directly contrary to the process the
Government has embraced with contractualism—while the New
Arrangements aim to engage and empower Indigenous peoples and their
rights, the transition from ATSIC to the New Arrangements demonstrated a
considerable lack of consensus or even openness by the Government. By
vigorously supporting the development of local and national Indigenous
governance institutions, as well as initiating legislation to reinforce its
193

These negotiated agreements are not the comprehensive “treaties” sought by some Indigenous
groups and advocated by experts. However, they may be an important springboard for a Government
previously closed to any form of treaty. Once the Government gains some experience with the negotiations
and outcomes of these agreements, it may be less fearful of relinquishing power to Indigenous communities.
194
INDIGENOUS FACT SHEET, supra note 22, § 3.8.
195
See The “New Arrangements” in Indigenous Affairs, ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., (Australians for
Native Title and Reconciliation, N.S.W., Austl.), Apr. 2005, at 6 [hereinafter ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL.],
available at http://www.antar.org.au/nsw_news-ltr_04-05.pdf (“SRAs have been variously described by
respected Indigenous leaders, Patrick Dodson and Noel Pearson as ‘not sufficiently well-developed and
funded’, and by Professor Larissa Behrendt as ‘reactive and aimed at interventions rather than proactive and
aimed at prevention.’”).
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commitments, the Government can strengthen the new policy and redress
any harm caused by the quick and uncompromising transition.
A.

The Government Acted Unilaterally in Abolishing ATSIC and
Rearranging the Indigenous Affairs Program

As Reconciliation Australia196 put it, “[p]olitics has determined the
timing of the current re-shaping of Indigenous affairs at the national
level.”197 With the ATSIC Board embroiled in controversy, the Government
took the opportunity to announce its plans to abolish ATSIC. Two and onehalf months later the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs revealed most of the details of the New Arrangements,
which began formally the next day, July 1, 2004.198 The Government
quickly moved to abolish the ATSIC Board, “leaving the 35 Regional
Councils in place until 30 June 2005, with skeleton staff and miniscule
operating budgets, to assist the transition on the ground.”199
In abolishing ATSIC and the Regional Councils so abruptly, the
Government created friction throughout the Indigenous community and its
supporters. Even though ATSIC was not an Indigenous creation, it operated
as and was considered by many to be the voice of Indigenous Australia.200
Many Indigenous organizations expressed grave concerns regarding the
complete lack of consultation with Indigenous people about the changes.201
Their sentiments were exacerbated by the fact that, “with limited
196

Reconciliation Australia is a non-government foundation established in January 2001 to provide a
continuing national focus for reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia. See
Reconciliation Australia, About Us, http://www.reconciliationaustralia.org/aboutus/recaus.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2005). It is the continuing incarnation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation aimed at a formal
reconciliation process established in 1991, by a unanimous Commonwealth Parliament. Id. (follow “what is
reconciliation?” hyperlink).
197
RECONCILIATION AUSTRALIA, 2004 RECONCILIATION REPORT 7 (2004) [hereinafter
RECONCILIATION REPORT].
198
See Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs, Australian Government Changes to Indigenous Affairs Services Commence Tomorrow
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media04/v04039.htm.
199
ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195.
200
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 5. The Senate Indigenous Affairs Committee found
“considerable support” for the continued existence of ATSIC, if modified: “Certainly, the support for the
continued existence of a national Indigenous representative body was overwhelming.” LIFE IN THE
MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 60.
201
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 5. The Senate Report restates the testimony of
Professor Mick Dodson: “It was like we did not exist. . . . [P]olitical figures . . . talking about our future
without and reference to us . . . seemed to deal with us as totally irrelevant and to ignore us.” Id. The
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies made the logical statement that
“Indigenous peoples’ own representative structures [should] be withdrawn only with the consent of
Indigenous peoples.” Id. at 63.
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explanation and no discussion,” the reforms went well beyond the
recommendations of the $ 1.4 million 2003 ATSIC Review.202 That Review,
based on extensive collaboration with Indigenous communities, had
presented the Government with a model to reform, rather than abolish,
Furthermore, some worried that the mainstreaming of
ATSIC.203
Government programs would squander ATSIC’s extensive bureaucratic and
cultural experience in Indigenous program and service delivery.204
In addition, the actions of the Government preempted any
Parliamentary decision on the future of ATSIC. As noted above, ATSIC was
created through a lengthy and thorough debate in the Parliament, and many
felt it was for Parliament to decide what, if any, changes were to be made.205
The Government defended that the immediate changes were administrative
in nature and did not require legislative amendment by Parliament.206
However, minority members of the Senate felt that while legally accurate,
this was disingenuous, since “the Government’s changes dismantled ATSIC
in all but name.”207
After the transition, the accusations against the Government
continued. Many Indigenous Australians complained that apart from not
being consulted, the changes were effected without adequate information
being provided to them.208 Additionally, although the Government had
promised to consult with the Regional Councils in creating new regional
representative structures, evidence showed that the Councils were not being
involved and that very little progress had been made.209 After calling the
post-transition period “chaos,” one NGO noted that many mainstream
departments “were unprepared for the transfer of staff, resources and
programs” and that many community organizations had their funding
delayed or interrupted.210
202

See id. at 6; HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26.
See HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 26, at 8; LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 6.
204
See ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195, at 7.
205
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 8.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See id. at 5; Angela Erini, Fed: Aborigines Left in the Wilderness Over Changes, AAP NEWSFEED,
Apr. 8, 2005.
209
See SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004, supra note 177, at 97.
210
See ANTAR N.S.W. NEWSL., supra note 195. One Senator even commented in a floor debate that
“utter chaos does reign as a result of hasty distribution of many of ATSIC’s functions to government
departments. Even the new policy dealing with mutual obligation through shared responsibility is unclear.
No minister of public servant has been able to say what SRAs actually are, produce guidelines on how
departments and communities should go about making them, or even confirm that they are legal, enforceable
contracts.” Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Mar. 8, 2005, at 71 (Sen. Ridgeway).
203
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Most of all, the quick transition created a sense that the Government
had not fully considered its changes.211 As Senator Claire Moore related,
“[The real concern is that,] once again, we may be experimented on and that
in another five to ten years we will come back and discuss exactly what
went wrong.”212 Thus, although the New Arrangements provide an
opportunity for better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, significant
hurdles remain for the Government to ensure that this is not another
“experiment.”
B.

Substantial Investment in Leadership Capacity in Indigenous
Communities Is Necessary to the Success of the New Arrangements

As mentioned above, the substantive outcome of negotiated
agreements is often affected by the sophistication of the parties at the
negotiating table.213 Some fear that, like previous attempts to remedy
Indigenous inequities, “current attempts will fail also if competent,
legitimate Indigenous structures are not equipped to fulfill their end of the
deal.”214 Encouragingly, many Indigenous communities have experience
with self-governance and agreement-making, both historically in the interIndigenous context and later extended to dealings with white settlers.215
This experience is extremely relevant to modern agreement-making as a
source of Indigenous legal customs and traditions.216 Some Indigenous
groups have even demonstrated their ability to organize into simultaneous
local and regional representation in modern Australia.217 This has been
211

See SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004, supra note 177, at 85 (“It is clear that the various components
of the new arrangements were not finalised at that time and have continued to be developed as the
arrangements have been introduced.”). In fact, the New Arrangements were modeled after ten ongoing pilot
programs, the results of which have yet to be evaluated. See NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS,
supra note 8, at 19-20; RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 7 (“[T]here is great danger in applying
as a model for universal change approaches such as the COAG trials, which are still highly experimental and
have not yet yielded quantifiable outcomes.”).
212
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Mar. 8, 2005, at 69 (Sen. Moore) (quoting
ATSIC Commissioner Alison Anderson).
213
See supra Part III.E.1.
214
Chaney, supra note 171, at 4.
215
See Langton & Palmer, supra note 74, at 46.
216
In the Northern Territory, for example, principles of Larraika law, which require visitors to show
respect for cultural authority of the traditional owners, underpins a regional agreement which seeks to
address issues facing Indigenous “itinerants” visiting Darwin from remote communities. The anti-social
behavior of many “itinerants” in Northern Territory shopping districts had been a perpetual grievance for the
business community. Moreover, the “itinerants” themselves are denigrated and demonized. The settler state
has turned to, and effectively recognized, the legal and cultural authority of the traditional owners over the
Darwin region. See id. at 46.
217
See Agius et al., supra note 98, at 210; infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
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apparent in the context of Native Title agreements.218 Even so, the
comprehensive arrangements envisioned by the New Arrangements will
require especially sophisticated negotiations.
Accordingly, the Government needs to encourage and support
Indigenous Australians in developing and maintaining strong governance
structures at the regional and local levels. If not, many will only be in a
position to engage with government on an ad hoc basis that will achieve
little.219 While this period of change will require time—many supporters of
the New Arrangements have appealed for patience220—sufficient resources
are the key to building and strengthening Indigenous leadership and to
achieving objectives which are common to Indigenous people, government,
and the broader Australian community.221 As such, the Government needs to
allocate funds to expand opportunities for Indigenous leadership,
governance, and administration training and development. It has begun this
funding with its 2005-2006 Budget submission, allocating “$85.9 million
over four years ($23.1m in 2005-06) to develop [SRAs] with Indigenous
communities.”222 As witnessed by many generations of Indigenous
Australians, however, funding does not automatically ensure beneficial
outcomes.223 Moreover, an apparent conflict of interest arises when one side
of the negotiating table is charged with the duty of empowering the other
side of the table. Thus, aside from funding, the actual development of
capable Indigenous representation needs to be regularly evaluated by an
independent body.
C.

The Government Needs to Support a Representative Indigenous Body
at the National Level

The absence of a replacement national body for ATSIC has a
substantial impact on Indigenous peoples across Australia. ATSIC had the
authority to consult with many agencies whose actions would affect
218

See supra Part III.E.1.
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 8.
220
See, e.g., Chaney, supra note 171, at 4 (“Leaders must allow sufficient time for effective
governance structures to be developed regionally and nationally which will be central to the success of this
most worthwhile initiative.”); see also RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 6.
221
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 5-7.
222
Press Release, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Dep’t for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, Government’s Indigenous Reforms Paying Dividends for First Australians—More Than $3 billion
in 2005-06 (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/media/media05/v0510.htm. See generally
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INDIGENOUS BUDGET 2005, available at http://www.atsia.gov.au/budget/
budget05/index.asp.
223
See KEY INDICATORS REPORT 2003, supra note 50, at i.
219

296

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 1

Indigenous peoples.224 Such a national voice “is important both to help
shape policy and give it legitimacy and for enabling Indigenous Australians
to call governments to account when their interests are not addressed.”225
The “individualized, short-term, reactive agreements” of the New
Arrangements cannot address the more complex and systemic causes of
disadvantage and discrimination.226 Moreover, ATSIC represented a major
force in advocating for Indigenous Australian rights in the international
arena.227 The U.N. recognized ATSIC as a non-governmental organization
legitimately capable of representing citizens in international fora.228 Without
a national body to represent the interests of Indigenous Australians, these
opportunities and safeguards are lost.229
A National Congress of Indigenous representative structures should
be put in place because local representative institutions cannot effectively
attack the systemic and institutionalized aspects of the impediments to
Indigenous socioeconomic and political development.230 For example,
“Australia now stands alone among settler common law countries in its
failure to introduce a Bill of Rights that would entrench the prohibition of
Instead, Australia’s
race discrimination under Australian law.”231
232
commitment to the prohibition is legislative, which “may be repealed,
amended, or possibly ‘suspended’ by a government that lacks a commitment
to human rights.”233 A national Indigenous body can more successfully
advocate for a constitutional rights framework than can one particular
Indigenous group.
To be fair, the Government does not oppose the idea of a national
Indigenous body. The Government is open to a new national representative
224

See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 2005, sched. 4 (Cth.).
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 6.
226
See Ruth McCausland, Ngiya Institute for Indigenous Law, Policy and Practice, Briefing Paper No.
1: Shared Responsibility Agreements, Feb. 2005, at 28, available at http://www.jumbunna.uts.edu.au/
research/shared_responsibility.pdf
227
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 63-65.
228
See id. at 64. ATSIC had official U.N. ECOSOC Special Consultative Status since 1995. See U.N.
ECOSOC-NGO Database, http://esa.un.org/coordination/ngo/search/esangosearchengine.asp (search for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission) (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
229
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 55 (noting the several lost opportunities for
consultation and participation with government bodies).
230
Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Self-Determination: Rethinking the Relationship Between Rights and
Economic Development, 2001 U.N.S.W. L.J. 70, para. 26 (2001) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/70.html.
231
Hannah McGlade, Race Discrimination in Australia: A Challenge for Treaty Settlement?, in
HONOUR AMONG NATIONS, supra note 67, at 273, 275-76.
232
See Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.).
233
McGlade, supra note 231, at 276.
225
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structure, but believes that it should be left to Indigenous communities to
form their own representative bodies.234 While this position has merit and is
in line with self-determination principles, there are significant hurdles that
face Indigenous communities in doing so.235 One may note that the NIC
serves a purpose somewhat similar to that of ATSIC. However, the NIC is
not a representative body and cannot speak for the Indigenous community at
large.236 Many Indigenous people are troubled by an advisory committee
hand-selected by the Government itself.237
Encouragingly, some Indigenous groups have already demonstrated
their ability to at least organize into simultaneous local and regional
representation in modern Australia. During Native Title negotiations in
South Australia involving several Indigenous groups throughout the state,
the groups debated diverse issues, attempting to construct a “united voice”
with which to speak to government and industry groups.238 In the end, they
put in place a structure, in the form of a Congress, which embodied that
“united voice” while providing for each individual Native Title group to
retain autonomy in its own decision making.239 With encouragement and
financial support from the Government, a similar process could lead to a
national Congress of Indigenous Australians.
D.

The Government Should Pass Legislation to Guarantee Its Promises
and Ensure Accountability

One feature of the New Arrangements stands out from all previous
attempts to organize a Government response to Indigenous issues: it is
strictly an arrangement of administrative units, procedures, and promises by
the Government—not legislative reform. Reforming through administrative
procedures fulfills the Government’s goal of flexibility in implementing the
New Arrangements. However, it also makes the New Arrangements less
transparent, more difficult to scrutinize, and potentially makes it more
difficult to hold the Government accountable for its performance.240
234

See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 131.
The Senate Committee on Indigenous Affairs felt it “unreasonably optimistic to expect that
Indigenous Australians will be able to organise and lobby in the same way as other national organisations”
due to “distances involved, the limited access to telecommunications facilities, and the poverty experienced
by many Indigenous communities.” LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 67.
236
See NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 8, at 12-13; RECONCILIATION
REPORT, supra note 197, at 6.
237
See LIFE IN THE MAINSTREAM?, supra note 23, at 74.
238
Agius et al., supra note 98, at 210.
239
Id.
240
SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2004, supra note 177, at 96.
235

298

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 1

Insufficient monitoring and evaluation processes exacerbate these
problems.241 Experience has shown that where agreements are often
confidential and without criteria for evaluating and addressing eventual
outcomes, those outcomes have been mixed.242
The Government needs to pass legislation that provides transparency
and accountability for the New Arrangements and forces agencies to create
systematic evaluation criteria. “Just as it is dangerous to make assumptions
about lack of capacity within Indigenous communities, it is potentially even
more dangerous to assume capacity within government agencies to deliver
this level of change,” especially given past Indigenous experience with
mainstream agencies.243 In creating evaluation criteria, it is important to
incorporate Indigenous measures of success—after all, it is Indigenous lives
that these proposed changes are intended to improve.244 The “now
fashionable ‘ideology of agreement making’ in Australia” needs to be
tempered through examination of the equity and sustainability of actual
outcomes of agreements.245
Beyond measured outcomes, the standards by which performance will
be measured should be addressed through legislative action. These will
necessarily be generalized standards, but should clarify the recourse should
either party fail to meet its obligation. Indigenous parties need to know who
will determine whether a failure has occurred, whether the entire community
will be held responsible for a community SRA failure—which will penalize
those who fulfilled their obligation—or just particular individuals, and what
penalty, if any, will apply. More importantly, legislation should clarify how
241

See id.
See O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 304 (empirically noting that outcomes have been highly
variable in agreements between Indigenous Australians and resource developers).
243
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 197, at 7. “[P]ast experience tells us: the natural tendency of
mainstream agencies is to cater to the mainstream. Without strong and consistent political and
administrative leadership, agencies generally fail Indigenous communities; mainstream service delivery
which is not delivered in culturally appropriate ways is unlikely to succeed . . . . Indigenous organisations
which are culturally appropriate and have authority in the community are essential to obtaining engagement
of those communities.” Id.
244
“Otherwise, how are Indigenous people to gauge whether a proposed agreement is likely to
generate positive results for them? How are they to hold accountable negotiators who act on their behalf
unless there is some basis on which to assess performance? How can Indigenous leaders and professional
negotiators demonstrate that they have achieved optimum outcomes in specific contexts . . . ? How can
Indigenous people evaluate the extent of concessions being proposed in one area or the gains being offered
in another?” O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 81, at 310. Eventually, external accountability and independent
analysis of progress are roles that should be played by a well established, legitimate national Indigenous
body with solid policy and advocacy capacity. In the meantime, appropriate agencies should be engaged in
the review process.
245
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an Indigenous community enforces an agreement if the government and its
agencies fail to meet their obligations.
Additionally, because SRAs only apply to “discretionary” benefits, the
classification of a benefit as an entitlement or discretionary presents a
potential source of conflict. The line between the two can be fine, and such
distinctions remain subject to non-transparent individual government
officer/agency judgments.246 Finally, the New Arrangements create an
obvious conflict of interest in Native Title determinations—the Government
is now directly involved in funding both opposing parties in a native title
claim.247 Accordingly, the Government should, via transparent legislation,
ensure the enforceability of SRAs and RPAs, establish a process for dispute
resolution, publish categories of benefits, and remove any conflicts of
interest.
VI.

CONCLUSION

All Australians stand at the brink of momentous promise in the
struggle to eliminate Indigenous inequity. The New Arrangements in
Indigenous Affairs are a large part of that promise because they embrace the
policy of negotiating agreements and engaging the sovereignty of Indigenous
Australian groups. Positive outcomes are emerging under the New
Arrangements, albeit slowly and on a small scale. For the Mulan
community, trachoma rates are now at zero percent and the community has
already signed another SRA to get training and supplies to refurbish their
run-down basketball court.248 With honesty, transparency, and dedication,
the Government can correct its own missteps, alleviate the discomfort
associated with this change, and finally move forward in fulfilling its
promise to eradicate Indigenous inequity.
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